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to his guilt or innocence may well depend on his being able to prepare for trial with an accurate knowledge of the prosecution's case.
Louis

EARL CONWAY

CASE COMMENTS
ADVERSE POSSESSION: APPLICATION AGAINST
UNACCEPTED DEDICATED PROPERTY
Waterman v. Smith, 94 So.2d 106 (Fla. 1957)
Plaintiff brought suit to remove an obstruction from an alley
dedicated by plat. The alley as it appeared on the plat, filed in 1886,
was in the shape of an inverted L. Defendant, having obstructed
the alley since 1920, claimed title by adverse possession. The city
paved the north-south portion in 1929. The east-west part had not
been opened, but there was evidence of public user in 1912. The
lower court rendered a decree in favor of defendant. On appeal,
HELD, whether dedication was accepted by public user in 1912 or by
the act of paving in 1929, title could not be acquired by adverse possession, since there was no evidence of withdrawal of the offer to
dedicate. Judgment reversed.
The majority of American jurisdictions hold that platting of land
with portions set apart and dedicated to public use constitutes
merely a revocable offer of dedication to which no public rights accrue
before acceptance., A gift cannot be bestowed without the assent of
the person to whom it is proffered, and if he declines to accept it he
can assert no claim of title. 2 It follows that in these jurisdictions the
doctrine of adverse possession is applicable to such lands.3
A number of states have enacted statutes that affect this problem
in various ways. For example, in Texas no person may acquire by
adverse possession any right or title to land that has been dedicated
to the municipality. 4 In Pennsylvania the municipality has twenty'Brewer v. Claypool, 223 Iowa 1235, 275 N.W. 34 (1937); Lee v. Walker, 234
N.C. 687, 68 S.E.2d 664 (1952), Parrillo v. Riccitelli, 123 A.2d 248, 249 (R.I. 1956)
(dictum). Contra, Osterweil v. Newark, 116 N.J. 227, 182 At. 917 (1936).
2
Kelsoe v. Town of Oglethorpe, 120 Ga. 951, 48 S.E. 366 (1904).
3

See note I supra.

4

TEX. REV. Civ. STAT. ANN. art. 974a

(Vernon 1952), art. 5517
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one years from the time of dedication to accept the property. 5 All
public rights, which cannot be barred by adverse possession, cease
if there has been no acceptance within that time.
In Florida it is questionable whether the doctrine of adverse
possession is applicable to property dedicated to but not accepted by
the municipality. There are no Florida statutes directly affecting
this problem. Florida has followed the majority view that no public
rights attach to the dedicated land until there has been "clear,
satisfactory and unequivocal" proof of acceptance. 6 Until the public
accepts a dedication, the rights of the parties who purchase with
reference to a plat are strictly private rights.7 These private iights,
which would be public rights had there been acceptance, have been
barred by adverse possession." Dictum in a recent case indicates that
adverse possession is applicable prior to acceptance: 9
"[U]nless, prior to such acceptance, some person has acquired
ownership, title and right of possession of, a particular street
by (a) mesne conveyance, or (b) adverse possession, or (c) the
public authorities are estopped as to a particular street by the
well-known principles of estoppel."
It follows from these cases that adverse possession should be applicable
against unaccepted dedicated property.
On the other hand, there are cases holding that public acceptance
may be made within a reasonable time, but before withdrawal of the
offer of dedication, as the convenience of the public requires. 0 In
Earle v. McCarty" the Court pointed out that failure of the claimant

McLennan County v. Taylor, 96 S.W.2d 997 (rex. Civ. App. 1936).
5
PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 36, §1961 (1954), Rahn v. Hess, 378 Pa. 264, 106 A.2d 461
(1954).

GCounty Comm'rs v. F. A. Sebring Realty Co., 63 So.2d 256 (Fla. 1953); Miami
v. Florida E.C. Ry., 79 Fla. 539, 84 So. 726 (1920); Kirkland v. Tampa, 75 Fla. 271,
78 So. 17 (1918).
7Mumaw v. Roberson, 60 So.2d 741 (Fla. 1952); see Welch v. Iserman, 4 Fla.
Supp. 131 (1953).
SMumaw v. Roberson, 60 So.2d 741 (Fla. 1952).
9Indian Rocks Beach South Shore v. Ewell, 59 So.2d 647, 655 (Fla. 1952).
2OE.g., Indian Rocks Beach South Shore v. Ewell, 59 So.2d 647 (Fla. 1952);
Miami v. Florida E.C. Ry., 79 Fla. 539, 84 So. 726 (1920); Kirkland v. Tampa, 75
Fla. 271, 78 So. 17 (1918).
2170 So.2d 314 (Fla. 1954).

https://scholarship.law.ufl.edu/flr/vol11/iss1/6

2

Webster: Adverse Possession: Application Against Unaccepted Dedicated Prop
UNIVERSITY OF FLORIDA LAW REVIEW

to allege revocation of the dedication prevented his establishing an
adverse claim. In Miami v. Florida East Coast Ry. 12 the Court held
that "while the city and the public were entitled to a reasonable time
within which to accept the proffered dedication .

.

. " use of the

dedicated property inconsistent with the dedication by the successor
to the dedicator's title "would operate in law as a revocation of the
proffered dedication as to the public rights therein .... ." (Emphasis
added). Twenty-five years was held not to be an unreasonable time
for acceptance in one case, 13 since there was no evidence that the
offer of dedication had been revoked.
These cases emphasize the continuance of the dedicatory offer and
suggest that the public has a right to accept the offer as long as it
stands unrevoked.14 The instant case reiterates this point. The defendant's possession began in 1920. The statutory period for adverse
possession would have run in 1927. If the doctrine of adverse possession were applicable to property dedicated to but not accepted by
a municipality, the defendant would have acquired title before the
paving of the east-west part of the alley in 1929. Thus, it is readily
apparent that acceptance was possible in 1929 only if the original
offer created a public right that could not be barred by adverse possession.
The Court found adequate evidence of acceptance but failed to indicate when it occurred. A finding that acceptance occurred prior to
1927 would have obviated the necessity for the holding that, whether
the dedication was accepted in 1912 or 1929, title could not have been
acquired by adverse possession unless the offer had been withdrawn.
It is possible that the Court found acceptance by the city prior to
1927, but this is not explicit, or necessarily implicit, in the opinion.
Failure to base the holding on an explicit finding that the city had
accepted the dedication prior to 1927 indicates that the Court thought
it unnecessary. It was unnecessary only if adverse possession was precluded. Thus, the Waterman case leads to the conclusion that an
offer of dedication gives a municipality certain undefined rights of
acceptance, and that those rights cannot be barred by mere adverse
possession for the statutory period.
GARTH

A. WEBSTER

1279 Fla. 539, 557, 84 So. 726, 732 (1920).

13Gainesville v. Thomas, 61 Fla. 538, 54 So. 780 (1911).
14See Walker v. Pollack, 74 So.2d 886 (Fla. 1954).
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